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There are more ways than one to skin a cat.1 – English proverb 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Statutes that time-bar actions relating to “improvements to real 
property” have long been construed in teasingly diverse and 
deceptively complex ways.2  A permutation of mid-twentieth century 
tort reform, these statutes emerged as privity requirements eroded, 
and left in their wake interpretive confusion.3  For the last half 
century, courts have struggled to define what qualifies as an 
improvement to real property, an exercise that pits the economic 
interests of industry against the personal interests of tort and other 
litigants.4  Relying on language, policy, pragmatism, and legislative 
intent,5 state courts are still striving to establish a comfortable 
understanding of this term and its application under statutes 
limiting related claims. 
Minnesota recently addressed a new facet of this issue.  In Lietz 
v. Northern States Power Co.,6 the supreme court considered whether 
installation of an improvement to real property must be complete to 
subject it to Minnesota’s applicable statute of limitations under 
section 541.051.7  Tackling the temporal aspect of real property 
improvements, the court held that an installation need not be 
       1.   THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (E.D. Hirsch et al. eds., 
Houghton Mifflin Co. 3d ed. 2002). 
 2. See Keith J. Halleland & Thomas F. Nelson, The Statute of Limitations in 
Construction-Related Cases: The Return to Common Law and Common Sense, 57 
HENNEPIN LAW. 8, 8–9 (1988).  See generally William D. Bremer, Annotation, What 
Constitutes “Improvement to Real Property” for Purposes of Statute of Repose or Statute of 
Limitations, 122 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (2004) (cataloguing various interpretations of the 
phrase). 
 3. David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. L. 
REV. 1, 17 (2005). 
 4. See, e.g., Marianne M. Jennings, Reposing: An Evolving Issue, 34 REAL EST. 
L.J. 470, 471 (2006). 
 5. See id. 
 6. 718 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 2006). 
 7. Id. at 868.  The statute states: 
[N]o action by any person in contract, tort or otherwise to recover 
damages for any injury to property . . . arising out of the defective and 
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property . . . shall be brought 
against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of 
the improvement to real property or against the owner of the real 
property more than two years after discovery of the injury. 
MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1(a) (2006). 
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complete to qualify as an improvement to real property.8  Lietz 
effectively expands the statute’s scope and, consequently, contracts 
the corresponding tort liability.  This holding deserves praise 
because it produces the proper result under Minnesota’s “common 
sense” approach to section 541.051.9  However, Lietz merits criticism 
for its unnecessary and inaccurate foray into legislative intent 
analysis.10
This note first examines the history of section 541.051 and the 
interpretive evolution of defining “improvements to real 
property.”11  Next, it considers the facts and holding of Lietz.12  
Finally, the note analyzes Lietz’s reasoning and advocates for a 
simpler, alternative analysis leading to the same result.13
II. A TALE OF TWO HISTORIES 
A. Overview 
The best way in which to understand the evolution of 
Minnesota’s improvement to real property statute is to establish a 
general history on the subject and then to trace the chronological 
evolution of Minnesota’s statute in particular.  The former provides 
a theoretical context for evaluating Minnesota’s statute as 
compared to other states.  The latter shows how Minnesota has 
developed its law, albeit through a clumsy waltz between case law 
and statutory amendment. 
B. Improvements to Real Property: A General History 
1. Privity’s Demise 
Statutes of limitation terminating liability arising from 
 8. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 871. 
 9. Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 
1977) (commenting that the Wisconsin Supreme Court “avoided the vagaries of 
fixture law” by determining meaning based on the language’s common usage in 
Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Wis. 1975)). 
 10. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2006) (stating that legislative intent may be 
considered where a statute’s meaning is not explicit); Olmanson v. LeSeuer 
County, 693 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2005) (holding that courts should not look 
beyond a statute’s language if its words provide clear meaning). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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improvements to real property were born of necessity.14  
Traditionally, architects and builders have been subjected to 
narrow liability.15  Courts achieved this restricted liability by 
requiring contractual privity to impose liability on members of 
construction professions.16  Certain builders enjoyed even greater 
protection under the “completed and accepted” doctrine, a close 
cousin of the privity defense that extinguished liability against third 
parties once a builder had completed the structure and the owner 
had accepted it.17  However, these types of traditional defenses were 
not to last.18
Courts began eschewing privity requirements in products 
liability cases early in the twentieth century.19  The flagship case of 
this trend is MacPherson v. Buick Motor, in which New York’s highest 
court rejected a privity defense and permitted a subsequent user of 
an automobile to maintain a negligence action against the car’s 
manufacturer.20  The trend of abandoning privity requirements in 
products liability cases infiltrated design and construction cases by 
the late 1950s and early 1960s.21  In the 1956 case Hanna v. Fletcher,22 
for example, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia rejected 
privity requirements for claims against builders.23  Subsequently, 
courts in other jurisdictions eliminated privity and other similar 
defenses, like the completed and accepted doctrine, throughout 
the middle of the twentieth century.24
 14. See Gerald Heller, The District of Columbia’s Architects’ and Builders’ Statute of 
Repose, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 924 (1985). 
 15. Id. at 923. 
 16. Jay A. Felli, Comment, The Elements of Ohio’s Liability Provisions for 
Contemporary Build Architects—An Unwillingness to Expand the Plan, 17 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 109, 111–15 (1991) (tracing the historical evolution of contractual privity vis-
à-vis improvements to real property). 
 17. Heller, supra note 14, at 924. 
 18. See Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a). 
 19. See Edie Lindsay, Comment, Strict Liability and the Building Industry, 33 
EMORY L.J. 175, 176–77 (1984). 
 20. Heller, supra note 14, at 924 n.11 (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)). 
 21. Owen, supra note 3, at 49. 
 22. 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
 23. Id. at 473. 
 24. See Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a).  Bremer cites the following cases as 
examples of courts abandoning privity requirements: Krull v. Thermogas Co., 
Division of Mapco Gas Products, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1994) and Brennaman v. 
R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994).  Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a) n.5. 
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Losing these defenses exposed architects, builders, and 
construction firms to indefinite liability.25  In response, these 
industries mobilized, lobbying to establish statutes to limit claims 
arising from improvements to real property.26
Several strong arguments for limiting liability existed.27  First, 
restricted liability would protect architects, contractors, engineers, 
and builders from the uncertainty of timeless claims.28  Second, 
restricted liability would make insurance rates more reasonable, 
lowering building costs overall.29  Third, as a result of lower overall 
costs, restricted liability would benefit the construction market.30  
With such sound policy arguments supporting statutory action, it is 
not difficult to see why nearly all state legislatures capped 
construction related liability.31
Still, the enacted statutes varied.  Some imposed a statute of 
repose, measuring a claim’s longevity against the date of purchase 
or completion; others created (as did Minnesota) a statute of 
limitation triggered by the discovery of an injury.32  The 
 25. Heller, supra note 14, at 924. 
 26. Owen, supra note 3, at 50. 
 27. Jennings, supra note 4, at 470. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (2006); Owen, supra note 3, at 50–51.  Overall, 
forty-five states have enacted improvement to real property statutes; only Arizona, 
Iowa, Kansas, New York, and Vermont have not.  Heller, supra note 14, at 920 n.4.  
Heller lists these statutes: ALA. CODE § 6-5-218 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 
(1983); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 37-237 to 27-244 (Supp. 1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 
337.1, 337.15 (1972 & West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127 (Supp. 
1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584(a) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127 (1974); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-50 to 9-3-53 
(1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-241 (1979); 
110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 13-214 (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20-2 
(LexisNexis Supp. 1984); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (West 1979); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:2772 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-A (1964); MD. CODE ANN., 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-108 (West 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260 § 2B (LexisNexis 
1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5839 (West Supp. 1984) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 
27A.5839 (Callaghan 1977)); MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-
1-41 (Supp. 1983); MO. ANN. STAT. § 516.097 (West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 27-2-208 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-223 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.205 
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-b (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West 
Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. § 37-1-27 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1983); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 28-01-44 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (LexisNexis 
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 109-110 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 12.135 (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536 (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-
29 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-2-630 to 15-2-670 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. 
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discrepancies further manifested themselves in differences vis-à-vis 
the scope of protection, the types of actions barred, and the 
equitable “grace periods” allowed for causes of action that accrue 
near the statutory limit.33
Despite their diversity, these statutes consistently generated 
similar interpretive issues, such as whether the statute applied only 
to buildings or also to building products.34  Even today the 
disparate statutes are still in the process of converging 
jurisprudentially on challenges such as validity under the Equal 
Protection Clause.35  However, without doubt, the most consistent, 
and often least lucid, issue underlying these statutes is: what 
constitutes an improvement to real property? 
2. A Bifurcated Solution to the Qualification Problem 
In answering the question of what qualifies as an improvement 
to real property, courts have usually adopted one of two 
interpretive ideologies.36  The first is fixture analysis.37  A small 
minority of courts rely on this common law analysis, which 
contends that to be an improvement to real property an object 
must qualify as a fixture.38  There are three components to a fixture 
analysis.39  The first is permanence of the attachment to the realty, 
which requires evaluating the “mode and sufficiency of annexation, 
either real or constructive.”40  Second, one must determine the 
“adaptation of the article to the use and purpose of the realty,” or 
rather the extent to which the improvement is necessary to use the 
realty.41  The final component focuses on the intent of the party 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-2-9 to 15-2-11 (1967 & Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3-
201 to 28-3-203 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a (Vernon Supp. 1984); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1977); VA. CODE § 8.01-250 (1984); WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 4.16.300 to 4.16.320 (Supp. 1984-1985); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a (Supp. 
1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.89 (West 1983); WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (Supp. 1984). 
 33. Heller, supra note 14, at 925. 
 34. Owen, supra note 3, at 51. 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Jennings, supra note 4, at 480.  Jennings 
discusses equal protection issues as they relate to a statute of repose.  Jennings, 
supra note 4, at 480.  The argument, Jennings explains, is that statutes granting 
protections to certain classes of defendants and not others violates the spirit of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Id. 
 36. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a). 
 37. Heller, supra note 14, at 932. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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attaching the improvement “to make a permanent addition to the 
realty.”42
One obvious advantage to fixture analysis is that its common 
law roots allow for substantial case law on which courts may draw to 
determine the status of an improvement.43  However, some criticize 
the fixture framework; Professor Gerald Heller comments that “[a] 
test based upon the vagaries of the law of fixtures has dubious value 
and unnecessarily requires a court to engage in almost 
metaphysical inquiries concerning the degree of annexation and 
the intent of the annexor.”44  Indeed, the “vagaries” of fixture law, 
whether under a fixture analysis or a common sense analysis, often 
lead to “complex and confusing” considerations for courts.45
Perhaps this is why most courts have opted for a “common 
sense” (also called “common usage”) test instead of the more 
stringent fixture analysis.46  The main thrust of the common sense 
approach is, appropriately, determining whether the addition is an 
“improvement” under the common usage or literal meaning of the 
term.47  Admittedly, the decisions of jurisdictions invoking this 
more modern approach are frequently haunted by the specter of 
vestigial fixture analysis; fixture factors, however, such as physical 
annexation and size, often play a demonstrative, not a dispositive, 
role in adjudication.48  Indeed, dispositive factors are difficult to 
find in common sense interpretations, as flexibility seems to be 
both the primary advantage and disadvantage of this mode of 
statutory construction.49  On one hand, the common sense 
approach provides a “flexible analytical framework that can 
accommodate the facts of a particular situation.”50  Conversely, 
flexible interpretive analysis also generates less consistent results, 
lowering the predictive value of the test.51  Still, most jurisdictions 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  Bremer cites various cases employing fixture analysis, including Little 
by Davis v. National Services Industries, Inc., 340 S.E.2d 510 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), Noll 
by Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA, 643 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1994), and Karisch v. Allied-Signal, 
Inc. 837 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 44. Heller, supra note 14, at 934. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a). 
 47. Heller, supra note 14, at 932. 
 48. Id. at 934. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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prefer the common sense approach.52  As the next section discusses, 
Minnesota is among these ranks.53
C. Improving “Improvements”: Minnesota’s Evolving Statute 
1. 1965: The Enactment of Section 541.051 
As mentioned above, several states adopted statutes of 
limitation and repose during the 1950s and 1960s.54  Minnesota 
enacted the first version of section 541.051 in 1965.55  Some 
Minnesota practitioners have argued that the adoption was 
“intended to provide protection to architects and builders.”56  
While no legislative history exists to confirm that this was the 
legislature’s motive in enacting the statute,57 other sources in legal 
historiography suggest that the statute was enacted in response to 
privity’s general downfall.58  Indeed, Minnesota courts subsequently 
imputed this intent to the legislature.59
2. 1975: A Fledgling Adoption of Common Sense: Kloster-Madsen 
The fledgling opinion in adopting the common sense 
approach for Minnesota is Kloster-Madsen, Inc. v. Tafi’s, Inc.60  The 
relevant facts of the case include Tafi’s contract with Kloster-
Madsen, a general contractor, to remodel its premises and Kloster-
 52. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a) n.10.  Bremer cites the following examples of 
cases adopting the common sense approach: Liptak v. Diane Apartments, Inc., 167 
Cal. Rptr. 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 643 A.2d 906 (Md. 1994), 
Allentown Plaza Associates v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 405 A.2d 326 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1979), and Jones v. Ohio Building Co., 447 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
1982). 
 53. See MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1 (2006); Kloster-Madsen, Inc. v. Tafi’s, 
Inc., 303 Minn. 59, 63–65, 226 N.W.2d 603, 607–08 (1975); infra part III.C. 
 54. Heller, supra note 14, at 924–25. 
 55. Act of May 22, 1965, ch. 524, 1965 Minn. Laws 803. 
 56. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8. 
 57. Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., Inc., 308 Minn. 237, 241, 
241 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976), overruled by Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 
865 (Minn. 2006). 
 58. Id. at 242, 241 N.W.2d at 802.  The Kittson court acknowledged that there 
is no legislative history indicating why the legislature acted to create the 
improvement-to-real-property statute.  Id. at 241–42, 241 N.W.2d at 802.  However, 
the court cited the fact that thirty other states enacted similar statutes in a wave 
just following the break-down of the privity defense; this trend, the court seemed 
to say, indicates that the Minnesota legislature acted with the same motivation.  Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. 303 Minn. 59, 226 N.W.2d 603 (1975). 
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Madsen’s subsequent sub-contract with an electrician to assist in 
the remodeling.61  At issue was whether actions taken by the 
electrician in accordance with the remodel were “improvements” to 
the premises under section 541.051.62
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the electrician’s work 
qualified as an improvement.63  In reaching this conclusion, the 
court invoked the Webster’s Dictionary definition of 
“improvement,” which defines the term as, “a permanent addition 
to or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value 
and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is 
designed to make the property more useful or valuable as 
distinguished from ordinary repairs.”64
The court also stressed that the electrician’s work constituted 
an actual and visible beginning of the improvement.65  Thus, 
through its reliance on dictionary definitions and descriptive 
factors, like visibility, Kloster-Madsen predicted the official adoption 
of the common sense approach in Minnesota.66
3. 1976: Confirming Common Sense: Kittson 
While Kloster-Madsen established Minnesota’s adoption of the 
common sense approach to related real property statutes in the 
previous year, Minnesota courts specifically interpreted section 
541.051 in 1976.67  In Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Associates, 
the county brought an action against its architectural firm and 
contractor for installing a defective wall finish in the county’s 
courthouse.68  The walling project was completed in 1966; the 
courthouse walls chipped away in 1969 and 1970.69  The county, 
however, did not bring suit until 1974.70  Thus, the suit commenced 
well after the two year period normally allowed for discovery of 
defective work arising from an improvement to real property had 
 61. Id. at 61–62, 226 N.W.2d at 606. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 64, 226 N.W.2d at 607. 
 64. Id. at 63, 226 N.W.2d at 607 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1138 (1971)). 
 65. Id. at 607, 226 N.W.2d at 64. 
 66. See Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 9. 
 67. Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Assocs., Inc., 308 Minn. 237, 242, 
241 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976), overruled by Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 
865 (Minn. 2006). 
 68. Id. at 239, 241 N.W.2d at 800. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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expired.71  The county’s claims were contractual, including breach 
of contract and breach of warranty.72
The issue facing the court in Kittson was whether the wall 
finishing qualified as an improvement to real property under 
section 541.051.73  Recast, the issue became whether the statute 
applied to both contract and tort actions.74  Ultimately, the court 
concluded that the statute applied only to tort actions and that 
because the county’s claims were contract based, they fell outside 
the statute’s scope.75  Accordingly, both of the county’s claims 
survived under the longer applicable statute of limitations.76  The 
court was cautious in coming to this conclusion.77  It chose to 
construe section 541.051 strictly, stating that the uncertain scope of 
the statute may not fairly apprise persons affected by its terms of its 
effect on their activities.78  The court further emphasized that the 
statute’s short “discovery” and nullification provisions could work 
harsh results on affected litigants.79  Finally, the court noted that 
certain aspects of the statute, particularly the ten year nullification 
provision, may present constitutional problems.80
Based on this limited construction, the court decided to 
restrict the statute’s scope to tort actions by third parties against 
persons “performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision, or observation of construction or construction of such 
improvement to real estate.”81  Of course, this reading eliminates 
contract claims from being affected by the statute.82  While the 
court conceded that the statute itself does not use the term “tort,” it 
supported its reading on several grounds, contending that because 
the statute’s language is derived from the tort lexicon, the statute’s 
application should be confined to tort actions.83  First, the court 
argued the statute refers to “injury” to property; second, the court 
required that “an injury arise out of the ‘defective and unsafe’ 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 242, 241 N.W.2d at 802. 
 73. See id. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 801. 
 74. Id.  See also Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
 75. Kittson, 308 Minn. at 242–43, 241 N.W.2d at 802. 
 76. Id. at 243, 241 N.W.2d at 802. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 240, 241 N.W.2d at 801. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 801. 
 82. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8. 
 83. Kittson, 308 Minn. at 241–42, 241 N.W.2d at 801–02. 
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condition of an improvement to real property.”84  Last, the court 
noted that the use of the phrase “proximate cause” in the final 
sentence of subdivision 1 was suggestive of the statute’s tort focus.85
Underlying this tort-centric construction is the court’s use of 
legislative intent analysis.86  The court acknowledged that no 
legislative history existed to inform the court as to the statute’s 
exact purpose.87  However, the legislature enacted Minnesota’s 
statute at a time when at least thirty other jurisdictions adopted 
similar statutes.88  These statutes, the court noted, were created to 
protect architects and builders from tort liability to third parties 
after the destruction of the privity doctrine in the early 1960s.89
Based on this speculative analysis of legislative motive, the 
court concluded that its strict construction “does no more than 
confine the application of the statute to its legislative purpose.”90  
Moreover, the court noted, other states’ statutes include more 
expansive language that specifically incorporates contract or 
warranty claims, indicating that Minnesota was free to follow suit 
but chose not to.91
4. 1977: Common Sense for Section 541.051: Pacific 
While Kittson focused on the scope of section 541.051, Pacific 
Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc.92 examined the statute’s 
constitutionality.93  Pacific arose out of a fire in a strip mall in 
Rochester, Minnesota.94  The fire department, in conjunction with 
both a fire investigator and an engineer, determined that the 
origin of the fire was a particular furnace.95  The court, however, 
noted that several competing theories existed as to how the fire 
actually started.96  The principle theory posited that the furnace was 
installed too close to the wall.97  This created a carbon build up 
 84. Id. at 239, 241 N.W.2d at 801. 
 85. Id. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 801–02. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 241–42, 241 N.W.2d at 802.  See discussion supra Part B.1. 
 90. Kittson, 308 Minn. at 242, 241 N.W.2d at 802. 
 91. See id. at 242–43, 241 N.W.2d at 802. 
     92.     260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977). 
 93. Id. at 553. 
 94. Id. at 551. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 551–52. 
 97. Id. at 552. 
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behind the wall’s sheetrock; the carbon later ignited, starting the 
fire.98  A second theory stated that a combination of events related 
to the carbonization process precipitated the blowing of oil onto a 
hot furnace access door, causing ignition.99  The final theory, called 
the “combustible materials” theory, simply hypothesized that paper 
and cardboard boxes placed near the furnace had ignited and that 
the fire had spread from there.100
These diverse theories foretold of the myriad defendants 
named in the case; they included the furnace installation company, 
the company that serviced the furnace, a tenant on the premises 
where the furnace was located, the furnace manufacturer, and the 
owner of the shopping center.101  These multiple defendants from 
distinct classes of professionals set the stage for examining Pacific’s 
main issue: the constitutionality of section 541.051 (as it existed in 
1977).102
The trial court found that the statute was “not 
unconstitutional” and held that the statute was inapplicable to 
Pacific’s fact pattern because the furnace, its installation, and its 
maintenance did not qualify as an improvement to real property.103  
The Minnesota Supreme Court differed significantly in its holding.  
First, it found that the installation of the furnace did constitute an 
improvement to real property and thus fell under the scope of the 
statute.104  Second, it held that the statute was unconstitutional.105
Several elements of the court’s statutory and constitutional 
analysis are worth examining.  First, in discussing the statute’s 
applicability, the court squarely rejected a fixture law analysis.106  
Such a declaration was clearly necessary because the trial court in 
Pacific used fixture analysis to determine that the furnace was not 
an improvement since it could easily be removed and was therefore 
not a part of real property.107  Looking to four similar cases, the 
supreme court noted that only one used fixture analysis.108  The 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 553. 
 103. Id. at 553–54. 
 104. Id. at 554. 
 105. Id. at 555. 
 106. Id. at 554.  See also Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 9. 
 107. Pacific, 260 N.W.2d at 553–54. 
 108. Id. at 554 (citing Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 
1974); Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1971); Yakima Fruit & 
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court then relied on Kittson as well as the adoption of the common 
sense approach in Wisconsin to justify establishing the common 
sense approach in Minnesota.109  This approach, the court 
explained, would avoid the “vagaries” of fixture law and permit 
determination of section 541.051’s meaning “on the basis of the 
common usage of language.”110
Second, in defending its constitutional analysis, the court 
looked to history and comparative jurisprudence.111  The court 
began by establishing that Minnesota likely enacted the statute as 
part of the trend in other states to protect architects, engineers, 
and contractors from liability to third parties.112  The court’s 
reasoning implied that following this trend made constitutional 
challenges to Minnesota’s statute comparable to constitutional 
challenges to related statutes in other states.113
According to the court, fifteen other courts had ruled on the 
constitutionality of similar statutes in 1977, and, of those, five had 
struck them down as unconstitutional.114
Despite the majority of states upholding the constitutionality 
of similar statutes, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck the statute 
down.115  The court defended its decision on the premise that 
legislative classifications must apply uniformly to all persons who 
are similarly situated and that distinctions separating the classes 
must be natural and reasonable, not fanciful and arbitrary.116  The 
court further explained that section 541.051 contravenes this 
premise because it grants special immunity to a class of persons 
Cold Storage Co. v. Cent. Heating & Plumbing Co., 503 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1972); 
Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975)).  Of the four 
cases cited, all but Smith employed a common sense analysis.  Id.  The court in 
Yakima used the approach to determine that a refrigeration system was not an 
improvement.  Yakima, 503 P.2d at 110.  In Rosenberg the court found defective 
street pavement was an improvement.  Rosenberg, 293 A.2d at 666.  In Kallas the 
court concluded that a fire sprinkler system was an improvement.  Kallas, 225 
N.W.2d at 456.  However, in Smith, a federal court in Virginia used a fixture 
analysis to find that a five-tone die-cutting machine was a “fixture” even though it 
could be moved.  Smith, 371 F. Supp. at 700–01. 
 109. Pacific, 260 N.W.2d at 554. 
 110. Id. (quoting Kallas, 225 N.W.2d at 456). 
 111. See id. at 554–55. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 555. 
 114. Id.  Those five states were Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, and 
Wisconsin.  Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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(the construction professionals listed in the statute) without a 
rational basis for regarding those professionals as part of a special 
group that warranted bestowing of particular immunities.117  In 
other words, the statute lacked a rational basis for excluding 
owners and material suppliers from protection, violating the 
concept of equal protection.118
5. 1980: Reacting to Pacific: Statutory Amendments 
Following Pacific’s invalidation of section 541.051, Minnesota 
construction law faced a practical problem.  A missing statute of 
limitations is every trial lawyer’s nightmare.119  Unfortunately, that 
nightmare became a reality when constitutional invalidation 
coupled with legislative inaction left the state without a statute of 
limitations regarding improvements to real property.120
To remedy the situation, the Minnesota legislature amended 
section 541.051 in 1980, drafting the version that exists today.121  
Originally, the statute read: 
Except where fraud is involved, no action to recover 
damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or 
for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the 
defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real 
property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for 
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be 
brought against any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision, or observation of 
construction or construction of such improvement to real 
property more than two years after discovery thereof, nor, 
in any event, more than ten years after the completion of 
such construction.122
Following the amendment, the statute read: 
Except where fraud is involved no action by any person in 
contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury 
to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or 
wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8. 
 120. Id. (referring to construction-related litigation governed by section 
541.051 in the late 1970s). 
 121. Id. at 28 (noting that the legislature amended other sections of the statute 
in 1988). 
 122. MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1 (1968). 
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condition of an improvement to real property, nor any 
action for contribution or indemnity for damages 
sustained on account of the injury, shall be brought 
against any person performing or furnishing the design, 
planning, supervision, materials, or observation of 
construction or construction of the improvement to real 
property or against the owner of the real property more than 
two years after the discovery thereof, nor, in any event 
shall such cause of action accrue more than 15 years after 
substantial completion of the construction.123
These legislative changes responded to Kittson by revising the 
statute to encompass non-tort actions.124  They further show how 
the legislature rectified constitutional problems with the statute by 
expanding its scope to individuals, thereby avoiding equal 
protection problems.125  Minnesota courts subsequently upheld the 
new language as constitutional.126
Because the statute effectively did not exist from 1977 through 
the enactment of the 1980 amendments, there were few cases in 
the early 1980s interpreting the section.127  Plaintiffs in that period 
were able to take advantage of a loophole that created timeless 
liability for claims accruing prior to the effective date of the 1980 
amendments.128  The enactment of the amendments combined with 
the construction boom of the early 1980s, though, led to a 
significant increase in litigation on the statute later in that 
decade.129  Much of this litigation focused on causation issues under 
the statute’s “defective and unsafe condition” clause.130  Indeed, 
Minnesota has long grappled with what injuries “arise out of” 
conditions that are “defective and unsafe.”131  For the purposes of 
 123. MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1 (1980) (emphasis added). 
 124. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 25. 
 125. Id. at 9. 
 126. Id. at 8–9.  The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the amended statute in Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982). 
 127. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 9. 
 128. Edward D. Mulally & Mark Bloomquist, Limitation of Actions Involving 
Improvements to Real Property: Scope and Applicability of Minn. Stat. § 541.051, 13 
MINN. TRIAL LAW. 16, 16 (1988). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 18.  See also Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 24–28.  Both 
articles discuss the case law evolution of interpreting “defective and unsafe” 
conditions that cause injuries under the statute. 
 131. See, e.g., Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 553–
54 (Minn. 1977) (holding, under a previous version of section 541.051, that 
negligence during installation can lead to a “defective and unsafe” condition). 
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Lietz, however, these issues were sufficiently settled.132  Rather, the 
scope of “improvement to real property” is the lynchpin of Lietz 
and the next critical jurisprudential step in determining the reach 
of section 541.051.  Thus, the 1980s case law that matters for Lietz is 
that which discusses the common sense standard of interpreting 
what qualifies as an improvement to real property. 
6. 1984: A Federal Standard: Adair 
By 1984, the interpretation of section 541.051 and statutes like 
it across the country had undergone several permutations. 
Minnesota had enacted the statute as a way to protect vulnerable 
construction professionals from third-party liability after privity 
defenses died.133  A decade later, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
interpreted a similar statute under a plain language approach in 
Kloster-Madsen.134  Shortly thereafter, the court specifically revised 
the scope of section 541.051 in Kittson by confining its application 
to tort actions.135  Just one year later, the court addressed the statute 
again by establishing a common sense approach to interpreting its 
language and invalidating certain sections as unconstitutional.136  
Finally, the legislature acted to correct and clarify problems 
addressed in Kittson and Pacific through amendments in 1980,137 
making the statute a ripe target for refining the judiciary’s 
interpretive approach. 
In 1984, Adair v. Koppers Co.,138 a Sixth Circuit case, established 
a methodology for interpreting improvement to real property 
statutes under a common sense approach.139  In Adair, an industrial 
worker was injured when his right arm was caught in a conveyor 
 132. See generally Mulally & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at 18 (noting that there 
was originally no distinction between “defective” and “unsafe,” and that courts 
would even delete the latter in opinions).  Minnesota courts eventually ruled that 
the words were not synonymous, but commentators pointed out that “unsafe” 
means risk to human life.  Id.  Therefore, reading the words as independent would 
render section 541.051 applicable only to personal injury and not also to property 
damage as the statute specifically enumerates.  This phrase remains unclear.  Lietz, 
however, satisfies both elements, dealing with a bent anchor, the installation of 
which put human life at risk. 
 133. Id.  See also Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8; supra Part II.C.1. 
 134. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 135. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 136. See supra Part II.C.4. 
 137. See supra Part II.C.5. 
   138.     741 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 139. Id. at 114. 
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belt.140  The belt, part of an oven, had been designed and installed 
by the plant’s previous owner and had not been modified since 
1949.141  Adair brought his suit in 1981, well beyond the statute of 
repose that would potentially apply to the machinery.142  He argued 
that the conveyor belt did not qualify as an “improvement to real 
property” and was thus outside the statute’s scope.143  The court 
ultimately determined that the oven was an improvement to real 
property and that the statute applied.144
In reaching its holding, the court defined improvements to 
real property under a common sense approach.145  Providing its 
definition of “improvement to real property,” Adair cited to both 
Pacific, which established the same common sense definition in 
Minnesota, and to Kallas, the Wisconsin case on which Minnesota 
justified its adoption of the definition.146  Next, the court identified 
factors to use in interpreting this definition.147  First, the 
improvement must be an integral component of the overall system 
or real property it purportedly improves.148  Second, the 
improvement should add value to the realty it was intended to 
improve.149  Third, the improvement should be useful.150  Finally, it 
should be permanent.151
Several states, including Minnesota, have incorporated the 
common sense factors iterated in Adair’s methodology.152  Indeed, 
given that Adair invoked Minnesota case law and even the 
Wisconsin case law through which Minnesota justified its approach, 
 140. Id. at 112. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  It is also important to note that while Adair deals with a statute of 
repose, not a statute of limitation as Lietz does, the main issue of the case is simply 
interpreting what qualifies as an improvement to real property.  Thus, the 
distinction between the two types of liability limitation is immaterial. 
 143. Id. at 113.  The Sixth Circuit noted that in Adair, the Ohio Supreme Court 
had not interpreted the phrase “improvement to real property” under Ohio’s 
statute.  Id.  Thus, the Sixth Circuit conceded that it must “make a considered 
educated guess” as to the phrase’s interpretation.  Id. 
 144. Id. at 114. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 115–16. 
 148. Id. at 115. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 116. 
 152. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a).  Minnesota cases following Adair, include, 
for example, Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1998) and 
Fredrickson v. Johnson, 402 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1987). 
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it seems natural that Minnesota imported the Adair framework.153  
Some jurisdictions have adopted similar factors but use alternate 
sources to define “improvement to real property.”154  Despite these 
discrepancies, Adair is significant persuasive precedent for its 
widespread use as a base for interpreting common sense definitions 
under improvement to real property statutes.155
7. 1988 and Beyond: “Improvements” Under Construction 
Even after more than two decades of interpretation, section 
541.051 remained an enigmatic law.156  Judicial applications of the 
statute generated befuddling and even paradoxical results, 
providing little predictive value about what truly qualifies as an 
improvement to real property.157  Minnesota has effectively 
managed this uncertainty in the twenty years following the statute’s 
enactment—the court has ruled on only nine cases involving the 
statute in that period.158
However, the construction boom of the 1980s swelled litigation 
under section 541.051.  From 1986 through 1988, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals together with the Minnesota Supreme Court 
issued eighteen rulings on section 541.051, double the number of 
 153. See Adair, 741 F.2d at 114. 
 154. Bremer, supra note 2, § 2(a).  Bremer notes that some jurisdictions use a 
four factor test including: value added, the nature of the improvement, the 
relationship of the improvement to the land and its occupants, and permanence.  
Id.  Other jurisdictions look only at three factors: value enhancement, the 
expenditure of labor or money, and intent to make a property more useful or 
valuable.  Id. § 10(b). 
 155. Id. § 2(a). 
 156. Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 34. 
 157. Jennings, supra note 4, at 476.  Minnesota has found the following to be 
improvements: walls, panic doors, storm sewers, hardwired smoke detector 
systems, unfinished stairwells, permanently installed electrical cables, and 
escalators.  Id. at 475–76.  Minnesota has found the following not to be 
improvements: large steel tubes, cement blocks for a wall, and church altars.  Id.  
See also Mulally & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at 17.  According to Mulally and 
Bloomquist, the supreme court has found the following to be an improvement to 
real property under the statute: rock-crushing machines, light fixtures and ballasts, 
electrical transmission cables that are part of a larger transmission system, 
electrical transformer vaults, and wooden posts that are part of birdfeeders.  Id.  
The pair also notes that parties at the appellate level did not even dispute that the 
following would qualify as improvements under the statute: septic systems, 
fireplaces, storm sewers, electrical switchboards, water drainage systems, floor 
drains, roof flashing, ceiling mortar, and patios.  Id. at 17–18. 
 158. Id. at 16. 
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opinions on the statute in the previous two decades.159  This 
explosion in litigation further exposed the statute’s weaknesses.160
The statute’s mystery is not limited to what qualifies as an 
improvement to real property either.  The statute’s causation 
clause, which requires that an injury must arise from the “defective 
or unsafe condition” of the improvement, has also caused 
jurisprudential consternation, as have provisions related to when 
the statute of limitations begins to run.161  The legislature addressed 
the latter issue in its 1988 amendment, which clarified that the 
section’s statute of limitations begins to run upon the discovery of a 
plaintiff’s injury, not upon the discovery of the defective or unsafe 
condition.162  The same amendment also clarified related provisions 
regarding contribution and indemnity under the statute.163
The legislature continues to tinker with section 541.051 to this 
day.  For example, in the 2006 session, State Senator Don Betzold 
introduced an amendment to section 541.051 to change 
contribution and indemnity language.164  Although this amendment 
focused on a different part of section 541.051, it demonstrates the 
extent to which the entire statute continues to require further 
clarification and work.  Of course, the work of improving a statute 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 18.  See Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 872 (Minn. 
2006) (discussing this issue, but noting that negligence during installation had 
already been established as an appropriate action under the statute). 
 162. Mulally & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at 31. 
 163. Id. at 32. 
 164. S.F. 241, 85th Sess. § 4 (Minn. 2007); E-mail from Senator Don Betzold, 
Minn. State Senate, to author, Katherine Johansen, William Mitchell Coll. of Law 
(May 18, 2007, 18:18:00 CST) (on file with the William Mitchell Law Review) 
[hereinafter E-mail from Senator Don Betzold].  Senator Betzold, the bill’s author 
stated, “[t]he bill was heard and passed from the Senate Judiciary Committee, but 
I have not taken that bill up for procedural reasons.”  E-mail from Senator Don 
Betzold.  Senator Betzold also stated that the Minnesota State Bar Association and 
the Builders Association of Minnesota requested the changes in response to Weston 
v. McWilliams, 716 N.W.2d 634 (Minn. 2006), another Minnesota Supreme Court 
case decided within weeks of Lietz.  Id.  However, no group or legislator has 
requested changes in response to Lietz’s holding, indicating that Lietz comports 
with the statute’s purpose.  Id.  Moreover, according to the Minnesota 
Legislature’s bill tracking system, no amendments regarding “improvements to 
real property” have been introduced.  Minnesota State Legislature, 
http://www.leg.state.mn.us/leg/legis.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).  Legislative 
publications likewise reveal that legislators have not taken up this issue.  See The 
Minnesota Senate Briefly, http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/briefly/ (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2008); The Session Weekly, http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hinfo/ 
swmain.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2008). 
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rests not only on the shoulders of the legislature but also in the 
hands of the judiciary; legislative amendments must be properly 
upheld by clear judicial interpretation.  Thus, case law contributes 
significantly to the understanding of section 541.051.  Indeed, Lietz 
is just the latest case law contribution to understanding Minnesota’s 
enduringly problematic improvement to real property statutes. 
III. THE LIETZ CASE 
The story of Lietz starts out, literally, with a bang.165  The claims 
in question arose when workers pierced a natural gas pipeline, 
which led to an explosion that damaged a Taco John’s restaurant.166
The parties and chronology involved unfold as follows.  In 
1998, Seren Innovations hired Sirti Limited (Sirti) to design a 
telecommunications system in downtown St. Cloud, Minnesota.167 
Sirti in turn employed Cable Constructors, Inc. (CCI) for 
installation.168  Northern States Power (NSP) supplied the area with 
natural gas.169  On December 11, 1998, CCI began to install a utility 
pole support anchor (anchor) to stabilize and balance fiber-optic 
cables.170  Undertaking its work, the crew demolished the sidewalk, 
placed an auger, or “anchor cranker,” on top of their anchor, and 
burrowed into the ground.171  After having delved eighteen to 
twenty-four inches below, the anchor struck a hard object, later 
determined to be a granite slab.172  The crew attempted to break 
through the object by removing the auger and striking the slab with 
a sledgehammer; the workers then replaced the auger and 
continued boring.173  Activity continued smoothly until, when the 
anchor sat twelve to eighteen inches above the ground’s surface, 
the workers smelled gas and noticed dirt blowing away from the 
anchor’s hole.174
 165. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 868. 
 166. See id. at 868; Lietz v. N. States Power Co., No. A04-901, 2005 WL 44905, at 
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005). 
 167. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 868. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 2, Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 
N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-901), 2005 WL 4662973. 
 170. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 868. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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The workers realized they had struck a gas line and notified 
the crew foreman.175  Unfortunately, the gas spread and less than an 
hour later caused an explosion that killed four, injured many 
others, and damaged surrounding buildings.176  Jaenty, Inc. 
(Jaenty), which owned the nearby Taco John’s restaurant, alleged 
that its building was among those that sustained damage and 
sought compensation on a negligence cause of action.177  However, 
Jaenty did not commence its action until sometime between late 
2001 and early 2002, approximately three years after the 
explosion.178
Section 541.051 establishes a two year statute of limitations on 
claims arising from the defective and unsafe condition of an 
improvement to real property.179  Jaenty admitted that it brought 
suit after the period expired but contended that the statute did not 
apply.180  NSP argued that the statute did apply and that it barred 
Jaenty’s claim.181
The district court granted NSP’s motion for summary 
judgment.182  The district court used the state’s accepted definition 
of an “improvement to real property” as one that includes a 
“permanent addition to or betterment of real property,” in holding 
that the anchor installation process completed at the time of the 
explosion qualified as an improvement under the statute.183  The 
district court’s holding is important in two ways.  First, it reflects the 
correct interpretation of the statute under a plain meaning 
analysis.184  Second, it is the supreme court’s basis for asserting that 
the issue of incomplete installation is proper for appeal.185  While 
Jaenty neglected to argue that the anchor was not an improvement 
under the statute because its installation was incomplete, the 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Brief of Respondents Sirti, Ltd., Cable Constructors, Inc., and Seren 
Innovations, Inc. at 2, Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 2006) 
(No. A04-901), 2005 WL 4662972 (noting that Jaenty had already been 
compensated under its insurance policy, so its insurer, Travelers Insurance 
Company, also had a stake in the case’s outcome). 
 178. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 868. 
 179. MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1 (2006). 
 180. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 869. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 869–70. 
 184. Lietz v. N. States Power Co., No. A04-901, 2005 WL 44905, at *2, *4 
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005). 
 185. Id. 
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supreme court held the issue was sufficiently preserved for appeal 
because the district court’s holding relied on a definition of an 
improvement to real property that invoked the quality of 
permanence, a temporal aspect of real property.186
A split appellate court affirmed.187  The majority cited three 
reasons for categorizing the anchor installation as an improvement 
to real property.188  First, the court explained that, “the anchor was 
a permanent addition to or betterment of real property as it was . . . 
installed during the course of a larger improvement.”189  Second, 
“the anchor enhanced the capital value of the property,” and third, 
the installation “involved the expenditure of both labor and 
money.”190  The appellate court also addressed the argument that 
the anchor and auger constituted construction activity instead of an 
improvement to real property.191  The majority rejected this 
argument, instead holding that the anchor constituted an 
improvement under the plain meaning of the statute and in 
comparison to previous cases.192
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at *4 (holding that the anchor was an improvement under section 
541.051).  The dissent contended the anchor was not permanent and thus not 
such an improvement.  Id. at *4–*5 (Schumacher, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at *2. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at *2, *3 (explaining that Brandt v. Hallwood Management Co., 560 
N.W.2d 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), cited by the appellant, is distinguishable 
because the activities in question in the case were not integral to the overall 
improvement, as is the installation of the anchor to the completion of the fiber-
optic cable system in Lietz).  The court also cited Wiita v. Potlatch Corp., 492 N.W.2d 
270 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) as a more promising precedent for the appellants, but 
subsequently distinguished it as well, noting that the injuries in Wiita were not 
causally connected to the improvement to real property in that case.  Lietz, 2005 
WL 44905 at *3. 
 192. Id. at *2.  The appellate court applied the Adair factors and found that the 
anchor was a permanent addition that was integral to the course of a larger 
improvement.  Id.  See also supra Part II.C.6 (discussing the Adair factors).  It also 
found that the anchor enhanced the property’s value by allowing the fiber-optic 
cable system to be installed, and that the installation required the expenditure of 
labor and money.  Lietz, 2005 WL 44905 at *2.  Along with these factors, the court 
noted that cases in which construction activity, as opposed to improvement to real 
property, was the focus, were distinguishable from the facts of Lietz.  Id.  Finally, 
the court mentioned that the facts of Lietz compared favorably with cases in which 
the statute had previously ensnared activities as improvements to real property.  Id.  
Specifically, the court mentions Lederman v. Cragun’s Pine Beach Resort, 247 F.3d 
812, 815 (8th Cir. 2001), in which digging a trench in preparation for a 
construction project qualified as an improvement.  Lietz, 2005 WL 44905 at *2. 
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Even more notably, the court waved the flag of opportunity, 
stating that “no Minnesota court has ever limited the application of 
section 541.051 to projects that have been actually completed and 
turned over to the property owner.”193  The appellate court further 
condemned the idea of such a limitation on the statute’s 
application, commenting that “[s]uch an application of the statute 
would place undue restriction on the statute of limitations, thereby 
allowing the statute to be applicable in only those situations where 
a cause of action arose following completion of the project.”194
Jaenty appealed,195 arguing that the anchor was not an 
improvement because its installation was incomplete at the time of 
injury and that the negligence involved failed to meet statutory 
requirements.196  The supreme court resolved both issues for the 
defendants.197  Turning to precedent,198 the majority noted that 
negligence during the installation process, as occurred here,199 
meets the “defective and unsafe condition” requirement of section 
541.051.200  When defining improvements however, the court hastily 
invoked an elaborate search for statutory meaning.  Contending 
that the statute supported definitions that included or excluded 
incomplete improvements,201 the majority declared the statute 
ambiguous and proceeded to legislative intent analysis.202
First, the court examined the need and occasion for the law203 
and found that the legislature’s 1980 amendment ensnared 
incomplete improvements because “the legislature had a broader 
purpose for section 541.051 than simply limiting the liability 
exposure which occurred after the erosion of the privity of contract 
 193. Lietz, 2005 WL 44905 at *3. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 869 n.1 (Minn. 2006).  
Despite little attention to the issue in lower courts, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that Jaenty sufficiently preserved for appeal the issue of whether the 
incompletely installed anchor qualified as an improvement.  Id. 
 196. Id. at 869. 
 197. Id. at 871 (concluding that the anchor qualifies as an improvement), 873 
(concluding that the injuries were due to the condition of the anchor). 
 198. Id. at 871–72 (citing Griebel v. Andersen Corp., 489 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 
1992)). 
 199. Id. at 872. 
 200. Id. at 872 (citing Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 
548, 552–55 (Minn. 1977)). 
 201. Id. at 870. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16(1) (2006)). 
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doctrine.”204  Second, the court looked to the particular 
consequences205 of excluding incomplete improvements, observing 
that the narrower interpretation would precipitate difficult 
determinations regarding when an improvement was “completely 
installed.”206  Based on these two points, the majority ruled that the 
legislature’s intent was to include incomplete improvements.207
Conversely, the dissent looked to the dictionary definitions of 
language used in the statute.208  It concluded that such 
improvements fall outside the statute because they are not 
“permanent” under the established definition of “improvement to 
real property.”209  The improvements were not “permanent,” the 
dissent concluded, because the anchor was still “being installed and 
was not yet ‘stable’” when the rupture occurred.210  Still, the dissent 
conceded, the anchor may qualify as an improvement under the 
statute eventually.211
IV. ANALYSIS 
Lietz demonstrates that the wrong means can sometimes lead 
to the right end and that even a well-wrought path can veer off 
course.  One charts the best path to Lietz’s destination by 
employing the common sense, plain meaning approach of the 
dissent, which, if properly executed, leads to the majority’s holding 
that the anchor qualifies as an improvement under statutory 
language and case law definitions. 
A. Legislative Intent: A Majority Gone Awry 
Despite its clear holding, Lietz offers only confused reasoning; 
the majority manufactures statutory ambiguity,212 wrongly interprets 
 204. Id. at 871. 
 205. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16(6) (2006)). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 873–74 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id.  For a more detailed analysis of Justice Page’s dissent, see infra Part 
IV.C. 
 210. Id. at 874. 
 211. See id. 
 212. According to Current Technology Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enterprises, Inc., 530 
N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 1995), a statute is ambiguous if it supports multiple 
interpretations.  Also, section 645.16 permits legislative intent analysis only if a 
statute is unclear.  MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2006).  Yet, section 541.051 has a clear 
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the 1980 amendments, and rightly but unnecessarily predicts the 
consequences of alternate outcomes.213
First, Lietz’s legislative intent analysis is unnecessary because 
section 541.051 is unambiguous.214  As is discussed below, a plain 
meaning reading is sufficient to resolve the issue of when 
improvements to real property begin under the statute.215  Treading 
unnecessarily into legislative intent analysis presents the potential 
for needless confusion regarding a statute with an already confused 
history.216
Second, Lietz’s analysis is partially inaccurate. The court 
correctly identifies that the statute’s original purpose was to protect 
builders and construction contractors from liability.217  The 
meaning.  See MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (2006).  As I will later address, the statute’s 
clear meaning renders further analysis unnecessary.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 213. See Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 870–71. 
 214. While not controlling in Minnesota, the Adair court established that the 
meaning of “improvement to real property” is the definition adopted from Pacific; 
thus, there is no ambiguity as to the phrase’s meaning.  Adair v. Koppers Co., 741 
F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1984).  Furthermore, the phrase’s words have clear 
dictionary definitions.  Id.  Thus, while legislative action and judicial interpretation 
regarding the statute have been unclear, the meaning of the statute’s words is 
clear. 
 215. See infra Part IV.C. 
 216. Legislative intent analysis is a perilous undertaking regardless of the state 
of the current statute.  Justice Antonin Scalia states his thoughts on judicial efforts 
to divine legislative intent: “My view that the objective indication of the words, 
rather than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of 
course, to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an 
authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning.”  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 30 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  
Tracing the evolution of legislative history, Scalia recalls the joke that “one should 
consult the text of the statute only when the legislative history is ambiguous.”  Id. 
at 31.  He laments that this joke is no longer funny, quoting a brief that began: 
“Unfortunately, the legislative debates are not helpful.  Thus we turn to the other 
guidepost in this difficult area, statutory language.”  Id.  Even judges who have a 
more generous view of legislative intent analysis, such as Scalia’s colleague Justice 
Breyer, contend that most judges start by looking first to the statute’s language, 
structure, and history to determine its purpose before delving into legislative 
intent analysis.  See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 86 (Alfred K. Knopf ed., 2005).  The words of 
Minnesota’s improvement to real property statutes have clear definitions; thus, a 
predisposition to be inclined or disinclined to legislative intent is irrelevant.  
Scholars favorable to and skeptical of the practice look first to the words, which 
are sufficient to resolve the issues in Lietz, making legislative intent analysis 
unnecessary, regardless of its theoretical value. 
 217. See Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 870 (quoting Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & 
Assocs., 308 Minn. 237, 241–42, 241 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1976)).  Mysteriously, the 
court did not employ this applicable and widely accepted legislative intent analysis 
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majority, however, fails to properly define the purpose of the 1980 
amendment.218  Neither the occasion nor the need for the 
amendment is related to interpreting the phrase “improvements to 
real property.”219  Rather, the amendment only expands section 
541.051 by bringing non-tort actions within the statute’s reach and 
remedying unrelated constitutional issues.220  In effect, the 
amendment is neutral because Jaenty’s negligence claim would 
have qualified even before the 1980 changes.221  Thus, the court 
makes an untenable leap in proclaiming that the amendment was 
somehow meant to broaden the scope of “improvements to real 
property.”222
The majority fares better in asserting that excluding 
unfinished improvements would force courts to draw difficult 
distinctions “between ‘partially-installed’ items that are not covered 
by [the statute] and ‘completely-installed’ improvements that are 
covered.”223  The argument is strong, but because the court’s 
analysis should never have reached this point, it is alas, superfluous.  
Moreover, requiring items’ installation to be “complete” simply 
begs the question: what qualifies as “complete”? 
B. Strict Construction: A Dissent Gone Astray 
The dissent travels the more promising path of strict 
construction in its analysis.  Adhering to Minnesota’s established 
by reasoning that incomplete improvements should be included to protect related 
industries from excess liability.  Id. 
 218. See Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that the 1980 
amendment was in response to constitutional concerns and that the court clearly 
responded to the amendment in Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 
1982)). 
 219. See Samuel D. Heins, Architects in Minnesota Law, 51 HENNEPIN LAW. 15, 16 
n.13 (Nov.–Dec. 1981). 
 220. Compare MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (2006), with MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1966). 
 221. See § 541.051 (1966); Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 872.  The fact that Jaenty 
represents a third-party interest is likewise unimportant.  Minnesota held in Jack v. 
Applebaum’s Food Markets, Inc., 280 Minn. 247, 250, 158 N.W.2d 857, 860 (1968), 
that the statute does not bar negligence actions by third parties. 
 222. See Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 871 (citing no legislative history for this assertion, 
confining its reasoning to one quixotic sentence: “This amendment indicates that 
the legislature had a broader purpose for section 541.051 than simply limiting the 
liability exposure which occurred after the erosion of the privity of contract 
doctrine.”). 
 223. Id. 
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interpretive approach,224 Justice Page mapped out the statute, the 
common law definition of “improvements to real property,” and 
the common sense definitions of the pertinent words: 
“permanent,” “addition,” and “betterment.”225
In laying out his argument, Justice Page dealt first with the 
language of the statute, which reads, “no action . . . arising out of 
the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real 
property . . . shall be brought . . . more than two years after 
discovery of the injury . . . .”226
Next, he invoked the Pacific definition of “improvement to real 
property,” reminding readers that such an improvement must be “a 
permanent addition to or betterment of real property that 
enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of 
labor or money and is designed to make property more useful or 
valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs.”227  Notably, Justice 
Page also cited to Pacific to establish the statutory construction rule 
that the court must give “effect to the plain meaning of the words 
of the statute without resort to technical legal constructions of its 
terms.”228
With this base established, Justice Page introduced the 
dictionary definitions of “permanent,” “addition,” and 
“betterment.”229  “Permanent” means “continuing or enduring (as 
in the same state, status, place) without fundamental or marked 
change: not subject to fluctuation or alteration: fixed or intended 
to be fixed: lasting, stable.”230  In applying this definition, the 
dissent swerved lethally when it concluded that an improvement 
must be complete to be “permanent.”231  The dissent’s reasoning 
purported that common sense (in the colloquial, not the 
interpretive, sense) dictates that the anchor was not stable, 
meaning it was not continuing or enduring without fundamental or 
marked change and not fixed or intended to be fixed, because it 
 224. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2006); Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, 
Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 1977). 
 225. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 873–74 (Page, J., dissenting) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1683 (1993)). 
 226. Id. at 873 (citing MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1(a) (2004)). 
 227. Id. at 874 (citing Pacific, 260 N.W.2d at 554). 
 228. Id. at 873 (citing Pacific, 260 N.W.2d at 554). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1683 
(1993)). 
 231. Id. at 874. 
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was still in the process of installation.232  The dissent conceded that 
the anchor may eventually qualify as an improvement to real 
property, making the chronology rather than the nature of the 
improvement the dissent’s concern.233
Additionally, the dissent failed to elaborate on when the 
anchor might become an improvement, leaving the reader to 
speculate as to how much progress qualifies as intent to fix an 
improvement to real property.234  Most importantly, the dissent 
failed to defend against the argument that commencing 
installation implies intent to fix the anchor as part of the fiber-optic 
system, which brings the structure clearly under applicable 
definitions;235 indeed, this is the part of the “permanent” definition 
that brings Lietz under the statute’s scope. 
The dissent also examined the definitions of “addition” and 
“betterment.”236  An “addition,” the dissent explains, is defined as “a 
part added to or joined with a building.”237  A “betterment,” 
however, is defined as “a making or becoming better: an 
improvement of an estate (as by the addition of new buildings) that 
makes it better and more valuable than mere repairing would 
do.”238  The dissent justified its rejection of the anchor as an 
improvement to real property based on its supposed failure to 
qualify as “permanent” under the applicable definition; it does not 
comment on the anchor’s qualification as an “addition” or 
“betterment.”239
The anchor qualified as an addition because it has been joined 
to the building through the fiber-optic cable system in progress.240  
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. A taciturn dissent on the issue of permanence may be deliberate.  The 
enigmatic nature of the permanence question led Halleland and Nelson to 
mention that previous cases indicate that “[i]t is by no means dispositive that the 
‘improvement’ at issue is not permanently part of the building or property.”  
Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 9. 
 235. See Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 874. 
 236. Id. at 873. 
 237. Id. at 873 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 24 
(1993)). 
 238. Id. at 873–74 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
209 (1993)). 
 239. Id. at 874. 
 240. See Lederman v. Cragun’s Pine Beach Resort, 247 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that a temporary trench dug to permit installation of a communications 
cable was an “improvement to real property” under Minnesota law and applying 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/8
11. JOHANSEN - ADC 6/11/2008  6:06:15 PM 
2008] LIETZ V. NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. 1583 
 
The anchor also qualified as a betterment because it is an integral 
part of the cable system, which undoubtedly enhances the value of 
the building to which it is adjoined more than would ordinary 
repairs.241  This point, admittedly, depends on the contextual scope 
in which one views the anchor; alone it may not qualify as a 
betterment, but the fiber-optic system overall would undoubtedly 
qualify.242  The dissent addressed neither of these points, missing an 
opportunity to bolster its rejection of the anchor as an 
improvement or to provide valuable dicta on interpreting the word 
“betterment.” 
Misapplying the “common sense” approach,243 neglecting to 
apply full definitions, and missing opportunities to expand its case, 
the dissent concluded that a partially installed anchor cannot be a 
permanent addition or betterment to qualify as an improvement to 
Minnesota’s two year statute of limitations for construction improvements instead 
of the six year statute for negligence actions). 
 241. In Lederman, the temporary nature of the trench was unimportant; the 
fact that the trench was a step necessary to installing the communications cable 
was the critical factor.  See id. at 815–16.  Indeed, the potential value of the 
improvement influences whether the steps required to reach that improvement 
invoke applicable statutes.  See id.  In the case of cable systems, courts tend to 
require significant stretches to cast a case outside the reach of an improvement to 
real property statute.  See, e.g., New Meadows Holding Co. by Raugust v. Wash. 
Water Power Co., 659 P.2d 1113 (Wash. App. 1983).  In New Meadows, the court 
held that a residence-destroying fire, allegedly caused by a gas leak resulting from 
damage arising from the installation of an underground telephone cable, was not 
an improvement to real property.  Id. at 1116–17.  The court based its ruling on 
the fact that the cable system was in no way connected to the residence the fire 
destroyed.  Id. at 1117.  The court also distinguished New Meadows from its ruling 
in Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Tyee Construction Co., 611 P.2d 1378 (Wash. 1980), 
in which the lines related to the injury directly added value to the property 
involved. 
 242. See Jennings, supra note 4, at 475; Mullaly & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at 
17–18 (revealing interpretive inconsistencies that could affect the “betterment” 
issue).  For example, Minnesota courts have found walls to be an improvement 
while holding that the blocks composing the wall were not improvements; one 
could argue that this shows that an element of an overall improvement does not 
qualify as a betterment.  See Jennings, supra note 4, at 476.  At the same time, other 
elements of improvements, such as ceiling mortar (as opposed to the entire 
ceiling) have also been held to qualify as improvements under the Minnesota 
statute.  Mullaly & Bloomquist, supra note 128, at 17–18.  These varied results 
demonstrate the extent to which the anchor’s classification as a “betterment” may 
be no less debatable than its classification as “permanent.” 
 243. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 874 (stating that defining the anchor as permanent 
defies common sense instead of applying the “commonsense” approach by 
interpreting words according to their common usage). 
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real property.244  This convenient prevarication preserved liability by 
betraying the strict construction approach it purportedly employs. 
C. Keeping It Simple: An Alternate Path to the Lietz Holding 
Section 541.051 is a statute in need of a consistent interpretive 
methodology.245  Lietz offers a clear holding, alerting litigants that 
incomplete improvements are within the statute’s reach; however, 
its misguided legislative intent analysis only further muddies the 
waters of section 541.051 by offering another convoluted 
explanation where clarity is both available and preferable. 
A well-executed plain meaning interpretation provides the 
same holding while also establishing the appropriate mode of 
statutory construction.  Because the meaning of “improvement to 
real property” is clear, there is no need to divine (or invent) 
corresponding legislative intent.  An “improvement to real 
property” is a permanent addition or betterment.246  A “permanent” 
addition is a component that is fixed or intended to be fixed; the 
anchor, already nearly installed,247 was fixed or, at least, intended to 
be fixed as an integral part of the fiber-optics infrastructure.  The 
anchor also likely qualifies as a “betterment,” since a 
telecommunications system would improve the property’s value 
more than ordinary repairs.248  It could likely be considered an 
“addition” as well since the cable was joined to the building 
through the cable system.249
Under this analysis, the court need only look to the statute, 
Pacific’s long-established definition, and the plain meaning of the 
words therein to find answers.  Incomplete improvements should 
qualify under section 541.051 not because that is what the 
legislature intended, but because that is what basic statutory 
construction commands. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Halleland & Nelson, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that inconsistent 
interpretive methodology has led Minnesota courts to apply section 541.051 in 
ways that surprise litigants). 
 246. Lietz, 718 N.W.2d at 869 (quoting Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, 
Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 1977)). 
 247. Id. at 868 (emphasizing that the anchor was nearly installed when the 
crew pierced the gas line). 
 248. See id. at 874 (Page, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the value component of a 
“betterment”). 
 249. See Lederman v. Cragun’s Pine Beach Resort, 247 F.3d 812, 815–16 (8th 
Cir. 2001). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, Lietz reached the right destination, albeit by a 
rocky, wayward course.  The plain meaning of both the statute and 
related case law support Lietz’s holding; thus, a linguistic proof, not 
a fumbling grasp for legislative intent, was all that was required.  
Still, despite its wooly reasoning, Lietz represents an important next 
step in understanding this often murky area in Minnesota law.  
Following Lietz, the timeline of section 541.051 is clear: 
improvements most likely begin at conception, not completion.  
The court’s resort to legislative intent analysis may reveal its 
approach to the statute; one that offers the greatest flexibility in 
controlling liability.  The court, however, should have preserved 
this interpretive methodology for a more urgent occasion.  While 
the analysis did not harm Lietz’s holding, it detracted from it.  After 
all, there may be more than one way to skin a cat, but some ways 
are better than others. 
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